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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 25 of Security Council resolution 1064 (1996) of 11 July 1996, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 1 October 1996 on the progress made by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) towards meeting the goals and timetable agreed between them. It covers major developments since my last report, dated 27 June 1996 (S/1996/503).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III on 11 July 1996, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in close collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America) has conducted intensive consultations with the Government and UNITA. Several senior officials of the observer and other concerned States visited Angola to urge the parties to move the peace process forward. However, despite these efforts, the progress achieved towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has been disappointing.

3. The Joint Commission continued to meet regularly to review the implementation of the monthly calendar of agreed tasks. On 22 August, the representatives of the three observer States issued a statement urging the Angolan parties to work vigorously towards the fulfilment of their commitments. On 4 September, I addressed a letter to the President of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, expressing serious concern at the persistent delays and postponements in the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

4. Many observers expected that the Third Extraordinary Congress of UNITA, held at Bailundo from 20 to 27 August 1996, would give the necessary impetus to the peace process; however, those hopes were short-lived. Although the Congress adopted resolutions reaffirming the transformation of UNITA from an armed opposition to a political party and its commitment to implementing the Lusaka

Protocol, it did not take the decisions required to facilitate the settlement of major outstanding issues, such as the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the extension of State Administration throughout the country. The Congress also rejected the Government's offer to Mr. Savimbi of one of the two vice-presidential posts, stating that UNITA needed his guidance during its transformation from an armed opposition to a political party. Moreover, the Congress expressed reservations about the proposed review of the Angolan Constitution, especially with regard to the electoral law, on which the parties had reached agreement earlier.

5. On 4 September, the Political Bureau of the governing party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), issued a communiqué expressing its dismay at UNITA's rejection of the Government's offer of a vice-presidential post for Mr. Savimbi, and called on the Government to request the Joint Commission to declare null and void the provision of the Lusaka Protocol which envisaged a special status for Mr. Savimbi. It also called for the suspension of talks on constitutional revisions. In response to a note from the Government delegation, on 12 September the Joint Commission reaffirmed the legal validity of the special status guaranteed to the President of UNITA and stated that, as an integral part of the Lusaka Protocol, that provision could be amended only by joint agreement of the signatories to the Protocol. The Joint Commission also requested UNITA to present counter-proposals regarding the special status for its President. On 1 October, UNITA submitted proposals for the special status of Mr. Savimbi as the President of the largest opposition party.

6. In order to fulfil the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol regarding the transformation of Vorgan into a non-partisan radio station, UNITA has pledged to complete the necessary legal and administrative formalities by presenting the pertinent documents to the Government. However, it has not so far done so. With regard to the United Nations radio, the Government has granted to UNAVEM III additional airtime on the national radio and television which the Mission has been using without restriction.

7. In view of the strained political climate, my Special Representative presented the two parties with a "Mediation Document", formulated in consultation with the representatives of the observer States, which outlined all outstanding military, police and political tasks. He called on both parties to take concrete measures to fulfil those tasks before 20 September. However, despite the promises made by the parties, in particular by UNITA, only marginal progress has been achieved so far.

8. Efforts are under way to convene a fifth meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, this time on Angolan territory. The Joint Commission expects that the two leaders will address a number of pressing issues, particularly the special status for the President of UNITA, the extension of State administration throughout the country, the free circulation of people and goods, the return of UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and the assumption by UNITA officials of their posts at the national, provincial and local levels. The controversial issue of the repatriation of mercenaries also remains to be settled.

9. In an attempt to accelerate the pace of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, a summit meeting of the States members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was held at Luanda on 2 October. The meeting, which was held under the auspices of the newly-created SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, was attended by the heads of State of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, by the Prime Minister of Swaziland and by the Deputy Prime Ministers of Lesotho and Mauritius. The leader of UNITA was also invited to participate, but he declined the invitation in spite of repeated efforts by a number of heads of State and by myself to persuade him to attend. In a final communiqué, the participants expressed their concern at the slow progress of the peace process and their regret at the failure of Mr. Savimbi to attend the summit. They believed that his presence would have contributed to the reinvigoration of the peace process. They called upon the Security Council to take into consideration the latest actions by UNITA and urged it to adopt measures, within the framework of resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993, to oblige UNITA to fully and urgently respect the deadlines established by the Council. The summit called on the international community to continue to provide support to the peace process at this critical stage.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Status of the ceasefire and deployment of UNAVEM III

10. Despite strenuous efforts by my Special Representative, only limited progress has been achieved during the past three months in implementing the military aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. Many deadlines set by the Joint Commission have not been met, particularly for the tasks to be implemented by UNITA. Expectations which were raised in June and July for the expeditious completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, the selection of its soldiers for incorporation into the Angolan Armed Forces and the demobilization of ex-combatants, have also been disappointed.

11. However, the ceasefire continues to hold throughout the country, with the exception of tensions in the diamond-producing provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. During the period under review, 55 ceasefire violations were reported, only 8 of which could be confirmed after investigation by UNAVEM III. All of them involved either unauthorized movement of troops or restrictions on UNAVEM III activities. On 8 September, the so-called "UNITA police" detained a UNAVEM III helicopter and its crew in Bié province. On 15 September, a United Nations aircraft was temporarily prevented by UNITA from leaving Bailundo. On 21 September, UNITA denied permission for another United Nations aircraft to conduct investigation activities in the area of Chitembo. These actions deserve strong condemnation.

12. The Angolan Armed Forces have completed 61 withdrawal movements from forward positions to the nearest barracks, and subsequently corrected all except one of the withdrawals which had been declared unacceptable by UNAVEM III; consultations aimed at finding a mutually agreeable solution to this case are continuing. In a welcome development, an agreement was concluded on the withdrawal of Government troops from the sensitive Lunda provinces. It is important to conclude this exercise as soon as possible.

13. As at 27 September, the strength of UNAVEM III military and police personnel stood at 7,264. During the period under review, several contingents underwent rotations and the Mission started to prepare contingency plans for the phased downsizing of its formed military units, in conjunction with the completion of major tasks envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol. My recommendations in this regard are contained in the observations section of this report.

B. Quartering of UNITA troops

14. As at 27 September, the number of UNITA personnel registered in the 15 quartering areas stood at 63,189, which exceeds the figure of 62,500 initially declared by UNITA to be the strength of its military forces. It is also expected that an additional 1,700 UNITA troops (including 300 deployed in Cabinda) will be quartered, and that some 5,500 troops will be incorporated into the Angolan National Police. While more personnel are expected to be inducted into the quartering areas, the number of desertions, which have now reached 11,500, remains particularly worrying. The UNITA leadership has promised to return many of these personnel to quartering areas. This undertaking should be implemented promptly and in good faith.

15. The continued presence of "UNITA police" in areas vacated by their troops is also a matter of serious concern. UNAVEM III is insisting that these personnel be quartered without delay. Unless they are, it will be impossible to extend State administration throughout the country as foreseen under the Lusaka Protocol. With the official closure of all quartering areas as from 15 September, UNAVEM III has initiated an extensive verification operation regarding the presence of armed elements, and weapons in their possession, in the areas vacated by UNITA troops.

16. After several unexplained postponements, UNITA finally handed over to UNAVEM III substantial quantities of weapons in the southern, northern and north-eastern parts of the country. However, despite repeated promises by the UNITA leadership, the overall quality of the weapons and ammunition surrendered remains low. Moreover, only 28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 crew-served weapons have been surrendered to the United Nations, while a total of 24,867 troops have registered in the quartering areas without weapons as at 27 September. The UNAVEM III Force Commander is preparing a comprehensive report to the Joint Commission on this crucial issue. It is imperative that UNITA do everything possible to dispel doubts about its full cooperation in this process, and to declare formally that it has quartered all its troops and surrendered all available weapons.

17. In coordination with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit continued extensive food distribution and health and sanitation programmes for the quartered troops and 120,000 of their dependants accommodated in satellite camps. While special civic training programmes focusing on demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants have been launched in the camps, humanitarian organizations have carried out over 130,000 medical examinations and follow-up treatments. However, the protracted presence of large numbers of people in quartering areas is a source of growing concern. Some UNITA personnel have been in these areas

for almost one year. This imposes an additional burden on international humanitarian operations in Angola and could create a serious threat to the peace process. It is therefore crucial to commence an orderly demobilization process before the beginning of the rainy season and to concentrate dwindling resources on social reintegration activities. The transfer to the Government of responsibility for the management of the quartering areas (which should become demobilization centres) should be effected as soon as possible.

C. Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

18. Despite the efforts of the United Nations, little progress has been recorded in the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces as envisaged in the framework agreement reached between the Government and UNITA in May. The process has been beset by numerous problems and, as at 27 September, only about 4,000 of the 26,300 UNITA personnel to be incorporated into FAA have been selected. Although selection teams were deployed to almost all quartering areas, UNITA continued to procrastinate on this issue.

19. Five of the 10 UNITA commanding officers expected to join FAA, including Chief-of-Staff General Arlindo Chenda Pena "Ben Ben", arrived in Luanda on 9 September and were well received by their FAA colleagues. However, notwithstanding numerous assurances, the arrival in Luanda of the remaining five UNITA generals did not materialize by 3 October, raising renewed doubts about UNITA's intentions.

D. Demining and road rehabilitation

20. Specialized non-governmental organizations, the United Nations-contracted demining company MECHEM, the Angolan demining brigades trained by the United Nations, and UNAVEM III military engineers continued to expand their activities throughout the country. While much progress has been achieved in this vital area, demining operations in some provinces were still hindered by restrictions. In Malange province, MECHEM's operations were stopped by UNITA for almost two months at the Cuiji River, while at the Cune River UNITA prevented United Nations military engineers from carrying out their demining activities. These restrictions are unacceptable, and UNITA must immediately desist from such practices and allow demining activities to proceed as mandated.

21. The casualties caused by anti-personnel mines in Angola continue unabated. A section of the strategic Malange-Saurimo road had to be closed temporarily following a mine explosion which resulted in two fatalities and in injury to four members of the Zimbabwean contingent. The Luena-Lumege road was closed after a mine incident on 10 August. On 22 September, four members of the Brazilian contingent were seriously injured in a mine explosion at Chicaunda. In addition, MECHEM had to repeat its mine-sweeping operations on the Saurimo-Luena road after old mines were discovered there. In the meantime, the United Nations has been able to step up road rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction, with a total of 32 bridges launched since the beginning of the operation. Many of these bridges are the property of UNAVEM III contingents. It would seem justified for the United Nations to absorb the costs of leaving

them in place, as an additional contribution from the international community to the economic rehabilitation of Angola.

22. So far, the United Nations Central Mine Action Training School has trained over 300 Angolan nationals, thus enhancing the capacity of the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE). Four Angolan demining brigades have been deployed to 4 of the country's 18 provinces. The fifth group of deminers has completed its training, and a sixth is receiving instruction. However, the overall programme of strengthening the national capacity has fallen behind schedule owing to poor cooperation of the parties and shortage of adequate equipment and demining supervisors. At the beginning of 1997, this programme is expected to be transferred to INAROE, technical support being provided by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Department intends to use for this purpose resources available for Angola in the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and to launch an appeal for further funding. I recommend that the equipment provided for the school and for the brigades be transferred in due course by UNAVEM III to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP in order to support INAROE.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

23. UNAVEM III has been able to intensify the activities of its civilian police component, now deployed at approximately 40 sites. This component monitors the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the state of law and order and the free circulation of people and goods, and performs other tasks envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol. It has also verified the quartering of 5,458 officers of the Angolan rapid reaction police in 13 areas and has monitored the adaptation of their weapons to their new mission. In most rapid reaction police barracks this adaptation has been carried out in a satisfactory manner but, in three quartering sites, units are still equipped with mortars, rocket launchers and armoured personnel carriers. However, the Government has now informed UNAVEM III that the adaptation has been implemented. Little progress has been achieved in the training of UNITA personnel designated to serve as bodyguards for its leadership; only 28 have commenced Government training courses and, of the projected 184 bodyguards, 102 have yet to be selected.

24. The Government launched the programme for the disarmament of the civilian population ahead of schedule; the operation, which began on 1 July, has been carried out in nine major urban centres, including Luanda. So far, the results have been modest, with 1,669 firearms and over 9,000 rounds of ammunition recovered, in addition to a number of rocket launchers, grenades, mortars and other matériel. While it is encouraging that these operations have been proceeding in a coordinated manner and under close UNAVEM III monitoring, the need to introduce incentives in the form of "buy-out" programmes has become increasingly obvious. The United Nations is also urging the Government to start collecting weapons in the possession of members of its Civil Defence Corps, who serve in almost all provinces.

25. Together with the UNAVEM III Human Rights Unit, the civilian police component has monitored and investigated alleged abuses of human rights. It is

of particular concern that these remain persistent, many of them being perpetrated by armed elements against civilians. The number of allegations of human rights violations reported to UNAVEM III has increased in recent months. This may be due to heightened awareness of the population following a nationwide programme of workshops and seminars organized with the assistance of the United Nations.

26. In cooperation with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, UNAVEM III human rights monitors continued to promote improvement of conditions in detention centres. UNAVEM III also held a series of human rights workshops for quartered UNITA elements and, at the request of the Angolan authorities, formulated a plan of action to reform the judicial system. This plan has now been approved by the Government and is being discussed with donor countries. Increased international attention and assistance to Angola in the area of human rights continue to be a major factor in the advancement of the peace process.

V. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

27. During the reporting period, humanitarian activities continued to expand to newly-accessible areas, many projects focusing on the transition from emergency assistance to rehabilitation. Activities related to therapeutic feeding, water and sanitation and the rehabilitation of health posts are now being implemented in many areas which have been deprived of assistance for several years. Seeds and tools for the 1996/97 emergency agricultural campaign, including major contributions from the European Union and the Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are already being delivered to the country. The beneficiaries of this programme will include internally displaced persons, returnees, war-affected populations, and demobilized soldiers. The programme is expected to cover a total of 305,000 families identified by non-governmental organizations operating in the countryside, as well as some 67,500 demobilized soldiers.

28. The prospects for the next planting season depend largely on the free circulation of people and goods. The presence of newly planted mines along some secondary roads which were previously considered safe is raising serious concerns among humanitarian agencies responsible for the distribution of agricultural assistance. Following the increase in rehabilitation activities, and in response to the partial failure of the 1996 harvest, the World Food Programme is distributing throughout Angola an average of 9,000 metric tons per month compared with 6,000 metric tons at the beginning of the year.

29. There is serious concern that the resettlement of internally displaced persons, which was expected to take place on a large scale prior to the 1996/97 agricultural season, did not materialize. They continue to be reluctant to resettle in their areas of origin without adequate security guarantees. As a result, over 1.2 million such persons will remain dependent on food aid for another 12 months.

30. In August 1996, a series of security incidents involving humanitarian organizations and, in particular, the arrest and harassment of humanitarian personnel, resulted in the loss of material and equipment designated for populations in need. On some occasions, the free circulation of people and goods was also hindered, particularly in Moxico province. Similar problems were reported in some parts of Lunda Norte, Malange and Uíge provinces. This trend is of great concern, particularly to humanitarian organizations implementing projects in remote areas, and has led to a decrease of humanitarian activities in those areas.

B. Demobilization and reintegration

31. After delays, the adoption on 16 August by the Council of Ministers of the National Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants marked an important step towards the commencement of the demobilization process. This programme comprises a set of complementary projects aimed at facilitating the short-, medium- and long-term socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It also includes additional support schemes, such as the Government's Special Reinstallation Subsidy, the Fund to Support the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Society, and the National Service for Reconstruction. Programmatic links are also being established with activities planned by the World Bank, bilateral donors and international development agencies. The current financial commitment of the Government to the programme is in excess of US$ 70 million. This effort deserves encouragement and urgent support from the international community.

32. Although the start of the demobilization of approximately 8,000 under-age soldiers was officially announced by the Joint Commission on 26 August, the process was not formally launched until 24 September. The United Nations and international humanitarian organizations will play an important role in assisting the Government to issue demobilization cards and kits, provide transportation and perform other tasks.

33. The Community Referral Service for ex-combatants, which is run by the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and UNDP, has now been established in six key provinces and is expected to be operational in 12 provinces within the next few weeks. The Referral Service, together with the Quick Impact Project mechanisms, will provide the demobilized with information and counselling services while facilitating their reintegration into civilian society. A special humanitarian assistance package is also being prepared to support the families of those UNITA soldiers who will be incorporated into FAA. However, the daunting tasks that lie ahead should not be underestimated since approximately 100,000 ex-combatants, including 35,300 former FAA personnel, must be demobilized.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

34. Angola continues to face a critical economic situation. Because of Government overspending, the country continues to face a serious budget deficit. The level of price subsidies, especially for petroleum products, remains high.

The Government recently initiated policy measures, including a decree which would end the commercial operations of the Central Bank, adjustments in interest rates aimed at encouraging domestic savings, increased taxation of the national petroleum corporation, and the adoption of restrictive credit policies.

35. The Government asserts that the "neo-liberal monetarist policy" which it intermittently pursued in 1995 has failed, and it intends to control the prices of staple commodities in official and unofficial markets. At the same time, all importation has to be made under strict Government licensing and subject to fixed foreign currency exchange ceilings. The new system of foreign exchange is determined administratively by the Central Bank in an attempt to maintain stability in the local currency. In the meantime, the economic situation is leading to distortions in prices caused by the different sources of supply of goods and services, both official and illegal, and many observers believe that present conditions may lead to rationing of basic foodstuffs. It should be noted that the Government has neither indicated the duration of its policy of direct intervention in the markets nor articulated medium-term or long-term economic goals.

36. Many external development partners of Angola were of the opinion that the installation of the new Cabinet in June 1996 would enhance dialogue with them, as well as facilitate quick microeconomic decisions, and they have been carefully watching recent developments. Several evaluation missions led by senior officials of UNDP, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have visited Angola in the last few months. In September 1996, the Angolan Minister of Planning visited Washington, D.C., where he held productive discussions on the Government's new economic policies. Nevertheless, for the reasons described above, bilateral donors, including those who pledged funds at the Round Table Conference held in Brussels in 1995, and international development agencies continue to be cautious about committing funds.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

37. By its resolution 50/209 B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $169,188,500 gross ($165,984,100 net) for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1996, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of $28,186,410 gross ($27,664,010 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III by the Security Council.

38. By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested me to provide updated cost estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1997, no later than 1 November 1996, for its consideration at its fifty-first session. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, the cost of maintaining the Mission during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated in the preceding paragraph.

39. As at 23 September 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $151.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 23 September 1996 was $2,044.0 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

40. While the ceasefire is holding and the parties continue to profess their commitment to the Lusaka Protocol, the lack of significant progress in the peace process over the past three months is a source of serious concern. Nearly two years after the signing of the Protocol, the continuing delays and unfulfilled promises, particularly on the part of UNITA, in implementing the successive timetables for the completion of key military and political issues are no longer acceptable. Despite the persistent efforts of my Special Representative, the observer States and other Member States concerned, the implementation process is substantially behind schedule and the lack of mutual trust between the Government and UNITA continues to jeopardize the attainment of lasting peace in Angola.

41. UNAVEM III is currently the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation and requires considerable human, material and financial resources. At a time when funds for peacekeeping are scarcer than ever and all expenditures of the Organization are being closely scrutinized, it is becoming increasingly difficult to generate international support for operations which do not enjoy the full cooperation of the conflicting parties. In the case of Angola, the pattern has been one of grudging compliance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, with protracted delays and last-minute concessions. This trend cannot continue and the parties, especially UNITA, must now decide whether they will implement in good faith all the outstanding provisions of the peace agreements.

42. The failure by Mr. Savimbi to attend the SADC summit held at Luanda on 2 October was unfortunate. His participation in the summit would have provided a good opportunity for a meeting on Angolan soil with President dos Santos to resolve key outstanding issues, to provide a much-needed impetus to the peace process, and to establish long-term stability in the country. I hope that such a meeting can be held in the near future. The two parties to the Lusaka Protocol bear a special responsibility not only to their own people, but also to the international community, which expects the Government and UNITA to demonstrate a renewed spirit of cooperation leading to national reconciliation. If UNITA genuinely feels that Mr. Savimbi cannot assume a vice-presidential post, it is incumbent on it to make a meaningful counter-proposal as soon as possible. UNITA must also ensure the earliest arrival in Luanda of all its generals for integration into FAA, the return of deserters to quartering areas, and expeditious selection of its soldiers for incorporation in FAA, so as to begin large-scale demobilization before the start of the rainy season. It is essential that these, and other pressing tasks outlined in this report, be accomplished urgently in accordance with a clear and precise calendar.

43. The demobilization and reintegration process is at a critical juncture: to support the demobilization of approximately 100,000 ex-combatants, the humanitarian community will have to increase its activities and donors will need to come forward with additional resources. Only 27.4 per cent of the costs of the demobilization and reintegration programmes are currently covered, and, unless the donor community provides the indispensable additional resources in the near future, the process will come to a halt.

44. Rehabilitation of rural communities is another important aspect of the peace process. Adequate funding of high-priority projects is needed to absorb the large number of refugees, displaced persons and former combatants. I strongly urge the donor community to maintain its support for the peace process by providing the required support for demobilization and reintegration and by fulfilling pledges made at the 1995 Brussels Round Table Conference.

45. The date envisaged for the completion of the mandate of UNAVEM III in the Security Council resolution by which the Mission was established, namely 8 February 1997, is fast approaching. Plans for the orderly and phased drawdown of the Mission are being finalized. Despite the considerable delays which have occurred, it should still be possible for UNAVEM III to fulfil most of its mandated tasks by February 1997. It is therefore my intention to initiate the downsizing of the Mission by withdrawing some infantry and support units by the end of December 1996. I am confident that the members of the Security Council will agree that further troop reductions should be made in accordance with the progress achieved in implementing the remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. I shall present in my next report a detailed schedule for the drawdown of formed military units of UNAVEM III, as well as recommendations regarding the role the United Nations should continue to play in Angola to consolidate the peace process.

46. The response of the international community to Angola's continuing need for support will depend on the concrete actions the Angolan parties take in the coming weeks. Unless serious progress is made in several key areas before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAVEM III on 11 October, I recommend that the Council consider only a short extension of the mandate, perhaps until 11 December, so that it can keep the situation in Angola under close review and respond appropriately to continuing delays, especially by UNITA, in compliance with the Lusaka Protocol. If, on the other hand, certain pressing commitments are honoured in the next few days, in particular the arrival of all UNITA generals in Luanda and acceleration of the selection of UNITA soldiers and their incorporation into the national army, the Security Council may wish to consider a longer extension of the mandate.

47. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and all staff of UNAVEM III, as well as to the personnel of United Nations programmes and agencies and of non-governmental organizations for their commendable efforts to further the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Angola, under challenging conditions.

Annex

UNAVEM III: Military and civilian police personnel (as at 25 September 1996)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops a/	Total
Algeria	7	-	-	-	7
Bangladesh	10	21	11	209	251
Brazil	20	10	35	1 046	1 111
Bulgaria	8	15	-	-	23
Congo	8	-	-	-	8
Egypt	11	15	1 b/	-	27
France	8	-	12 b/	-	20
Guinea-Bissau	18	3	-	-	21
Hungary	10	8	-	-	18
India	20	8	50	1 030	1 108
Italy	-	-	4 b/	-	4
Jordan	20	20	3 b/	-	43
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	20	20	3 b/	-	43
Mali	10	15	-	-	25
Namibia	-	-	6	203	209
Netherlands	12	10	8 b/	-	30
New Zealand	6	-	9 b/	-	15
Nigeria	20	21	-	-	41
Norway	5	-	-	-	5
Pakistan	10	-	15 b/	-	25
Poland	5	-	-	-	5
Portugal	11	21	14	311	357
Republic of Korea	-	-	6	198	204
Romania	-	-	23	872	895
Russian Federation	10	-	2	158	170
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	23	10	2 b/	-	35

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops a/	Total
Ukraine	5	-	8	203	216
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	-	-	1	-	1
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	10	14	44 b/	813	881
Zambia	10	15	23	496	544
Zimbabwe	22	22	40	810	894
Total	344	251	320 c/	6 349	7 264

a/ Including military police.

b/ Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

c/ The total figure does not include the five demining experts seconded by Germany.

UNAVEM III
Deployment as of 25 September 1996
HQ UNAVEM HQ
RHQ Regional HQ
Planned UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's only
UNPO's only
Each Regional HQ is co-located with: RUS and POR
CONGO
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
Atlantic Ocean
LUANDA
Cabinda
Soyo
Sumba
Noqui
M'banza Congo
Maquela do Zombo
Quimbele
N'zeto
Negage/ Bungo
Uige
Caxito
Quibaxe
Calomboloca
N'dalatando
Malanje
Catala
Cafunfo
Luzamba
Muchinda
Camaxilo
Cuilo
Lovua
Dundo
Andrada
Lucapa
Chiluage
SAURIMO
Cacolo
LUENA
Lumeje
Luau
Cazombo
Quibala/ Gungo
Sumbe
Waku Kungo
Alto Hama/ Londumbali
Balombo
Benguela
Lobito
Cubal
Chongoroi
Chicuma
Caconda
Quilengues
Cacula
Matala
Kuvango
Namibe
LUBANGO
Xangongo
Ondjiva
HUAMBO
Bailundo
Kuito
Cuemba
Vila Nova/ Sambo
Chitembo/ Soma Kuanza
N'gove/ Galague
MENONGUE
Caiundo
Mavinga
Cuito Cuanavale
Lumbala N'guimbo
Licua
Jamba
Mucusso
NORTHERN REGION
CENTRAL REGION
NORTH-EASTERN REGION
EASTERN REGION
SOUTHERN REGION
SOUTH-EASTERN REGION
International boundary
National capital
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, at 0600 hours on 25 September 1996, a United States helicopter armed with missiles flew over two Iraqi patrol boats in Iraqi territorial waters and continued to fly over them as far as buoy No. 5 at coordinates 705915 (1:100,000 map of Mina' al-Bakr).

I request you to intervene with the United States Government to cease such recurrent and unjustified acts of provocation, which create tension in the region and contravene the Charter of the United Nations, as well as international law. I also affirm the legally established right of the Government of Iraq to claim compensation for the damage caused by such hostile acts in accordance with the principle of international responsibility.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-26497 (E) 081096 081096

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/829
7 October 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

1. At 1100 hours on 20 September 1996, when a captain in the Iraqi medical corps and two Iraqi privates, making a routine patrol within the Iraqi sector of the demilitarized zone, had reached a point opposite the Kuwaiti earthen embankment at a distance of 300 metres, an armed Kuwaiti squad consisting of five men emerged from behind the embankment and opened sustained fire on the Iraqi patrol. The Kuwaitis then compelled the members of the patrol to cross the ditch and the earthen embankment in the direction of the Kuwaiti side of the zone, together with the driver of a civilian water-supply truck that happened to be in the vicinity. They also fired on the civilian truck. The truck in question was subsequently seen by members of the UNIKOM mission, who took photographs of the bullet holes in it. After the intervention of the UNIKOM mission, Kuwait released the four men at 2000 hours on 28 September 1996 in front of the Hadiyah guard post near the Kuwaiti embankment.

2. At 1800 hours on 25 September 1996, two Kuwaiti boats, one white in colour with three persons aboard and the other black with two persons aboard, entered Iraqi territorial waters at coordinates 300100 on the 1:10000 Faw chart. After being detected by the Iraqi services covering that area, the boats withdrew to the Kuwaiti side.

3. At 1700 hours on 29 September 1996, a Kuwaiti patrol boat opened fire on an Iraqi patrol boat within Iraq's territorial waters near buoy No. 11 at coordinates 360015 on the 1:10000 Faw chart. The Kuwaiti boat subsequently headed in the direction of the Kuwaiti coast (approximately 25 to 30 km west of Mina al-Amiq).

I would request you to intervene with Kuwait in order to bring an end to such hostile acts, which have been frequent and are prejudicial to the sovereignty of the Republic of Iraq. Besides being flagrantly at variance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, they are aimed at destabilizing and creating a climate of tension in the region. I would also request you to confirm the above-mentioned acts as violations committed by the

Kuwaiti side in the demilitarized zone. I reaffirm the legitimate right of the Republic of Iraq to compensation for the harm sustained by Iraq and by its citizens and for the damage caused to their property as a consequence of these hostile acts, in accordance with the principle of international accountability.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/461
S/1996/830
7 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 81

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 7 October 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the joint declaration of the President of the Republic of Serbia, H.E. Mr. Slobodan Milošević, and the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegović.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 81, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-26514 (E) 081096 091096

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

JOINT DECLARATION

I Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Alija Izetbegovic are firmly committed to peace and strive for:
lasting stability in Southeast Europe,
equality and cooperation of all nations and people.

II They will persist in their efforts to have the time of confrontations and conflicts replaced by the time of cooperation and prosperity.

III The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Hercegovina will resolve all mutual issues in the spirit of good will and understanding.

Achieving and maintaining the atmosphere of good will and understanding assumes that they will refrain, in their bilateral and international relations, from political and legal acts which do not contribute to the development of friendly relations and cooperation.

IV The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will respect the integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina in accordance with the Dayton Agreement which affirmed the continuity of various forms of statal organization of Bosnia and Hercegovina that the peoples of Bosnia and Hercegovina had during their history.

Bosnia and Hercegovina accepts the State continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Both sides agree to resolve issues of succession on the basis of the rules of international law on succession of States and by agreement.

V Ensuring pre-conditions for resolving all outstanding issues in the spirit of peace and cooperation,

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Hercegovina will:
- establish mutual diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors;
- ensure that citizens can travel across the border without visas or any particular formalities;
- remove all restrictions on free trade and business activities of both sides;
- ensure, on the basis of reciprocity, equal treatment for business subjets from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Hercegovina in respect to the use of road, railway and other traffic and infrastructure facilities;
- encourage the development of long-term economic cooperation and provide special facilities for the opening of economic representative offices and other institutions of importance to the development of economic, cultural, scientific, technical and other forms of cooperation.

VI In order to realize the foregoing objectives the two sides will immediately proceed to the preparation and conclusion of respective agreements.

VII The two Presidents express their gratitude to President Jacques Chirac for his hospitality and emphasize the importance of the constructive role played by France and its contribution to the process of strengthening peace and stability in Southeast Europe.

Paris, 3 October 1996

Slobodan Milosevic, signed

Alija Izetbegovic, signed

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/462
S/1996/831
7 October 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC, ENGLISH, FRENCH AND SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda items 27, 71, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 145 and 159
NECESSITY OF ENDING THE ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EMBARGO IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST CUBA
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
MACROECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS
SECTORAL POLICY QUESTIONS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT
ELIMINATION OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS
FINANCIAL REPORTS AND AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, AND REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF AUDITORS
REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 1994-1995
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ELIMINATION OF COERCIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMPULSION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 30 September 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to enclose the Declaration of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries adopted at the meeting held on 24 September 1996 at United Nations Headquarters to celebrate the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 27, 71, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 145 and 159, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Julio LONDOÑO PAREDES
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Declaration of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, issued on 24 September 1996 on the occasion of the celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Movement

The heads of State or Government, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of delegation of the non-aligned countries who met in New York on the occasion of the celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, paid homage to the founding fathers for the courage, vision, leadership and commitment they showed, which inspired the historic decision leading to the creation of the Movement.

They reaffirmed that the philosophy of non-alignment and its main principles maintained their full validity, and that, under the current circumstances, the Movement constituted today more than ever the ideal forum to continue to coordinate the interests and positions of the non-aligned countries in the international arena. They declared their firm commitment that the Movement should continue to lead the developing countries in negotiations and in international forums.

They emphasized that the activities of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries would continue to be based on the principle of solidarity and that its action would be inspired by the legacy from the struggle against colonialism and racism, the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the full respect and promotion of international law, abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirmed the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation. They also called upon the international community to resist jointly all new modalities of intervention, economic coercion and other measures of an extraterritorial character that currently threaten the non-aligned countries.

They affirmed that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, faithful to its tradition of renewing itself according to the needs demanded by changes in international relations, would continue to promote collective action with the purpose of extending its role and participation in world affairs; it would reinforce the means and broaden the issues of consultation with other countries.

They declared that during the next century, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, in accordance with the Final Document of the Cartagena Summit, would promote, with the same determination as in the present, economic and social development, the eradication of poverty, the solution to the debt problem, the fight against international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and nuclear disarmament.

They reaffirmed that the Movement would continue to promote the restructuring, revitalization and democratization of the United Nations based on the principles contained in its Charter, as well as the restructuring of the international financial system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, all on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of States.

They urged all members of the international community to eradicate from the face of the earth all imperial, hegemonic and aggressive policies and to contribute to the construction of a democratic system of international relations that responds to the aspirations for development, peace, equality and justice of the countries and peoples of the globe.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/832
7 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ZIMBABWE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I wish to recall my letter of 4 October 1996, by which I informed you that the summit meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was held recently at Luanda, had selected a five-man team composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Chairman) to proceed to New York in order to participate in the debate on the peace process in Angola.

On behalf of the five States Members of the United Nations mentioned above, I wish formally to request Your Excellency to convene on Thursday, 10 October 1996, a meeting of the Security Council to consider the critical situation in Angola. I wish to stress that the meeting that my country and the other four are requesting is separate from the Security Council meeting scheduled for Friday, 11 October, for the purpose of renewing the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).

(Signed) M. T. MAPURANGA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-26532 (E) 071096 081096

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/833
7 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter dated 7 October 1996, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

96-26392 (E) 081096 091096

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Annex

Letter dated 7 October 1996 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General

In paragraph 8 of its resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Council reports on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Those reports were to be submitted when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715 (1991).

In paragraph 16 of its resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic requirements for progress reports under resolution 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General to submit such consolidated reports every six months to the Council commencing on 11 April 1996.

Accordingly, I am requesting you kindly to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed second such consolidated semi-annual report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX
Director General

Appendix

Second consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051, adopted on 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic requirements for progress reports under resolution 699 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit such consolidated reports every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996[1].

2. The Director General submits herewith the second such consolidated report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996).

II. INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

A. IAEA-30 INSPECTION MISSION

3. As described in the previous report (document S/1996/261), a radical revision of the Full, Final, and Complete Declaration (FFCD) of the Iraqi covert nuclear programme was requested in September 1995 in the course of the twenty-eighth inspection mission to Iraq. In response, a six-volume document totalling some 1019 pages was provided by Iraq on 1 March 1996 in draft form. The IAEA's Action Team, with the assistance of experts from Member States, undertook the assessment of the draft revised FFCD as a high priority task.

4. By early May 1996, a first detailed analysis of the content of the Iraqi draft FFCD had been completed. The document was found to provide an acceptable basis to start discussions with the Iraqi counterpart in order to arrive at a satisfactory final version.

5. An "ad hoc" mission (IAEA-30) was organised to clarify ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions in the draft FFCD and to request additional information which in the IAEA's judgement were needed in certain areas. The first stage of IAEA-30 was conducted from 13 to 19 May 1996 and

[1] The first consolidated report by the Director General of the IAEA was circulated on 11 April 1996 as document S/1996/261.

the second took place from 17 June to 8 July 1996. Based on the results achieved in a series of meetings with the counterpart, Iraq undertook to prepare a second draft of the FFCD which, apart from the volume related to EMIS technology, was provided to the IAEA on 21 June 1996. Meetings and discussions on the content of the second draft continued between the Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) and Iraqi authorities throughout July and August 1996. On 7 September 1996, the NMG in Baghdad received the electronic copy of what the Iraqi counterpart declared was the final version of their FFCD.

6. As soon as the electronic copy of the FFCD final version was received in the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna (17 September 1996), the Action Team undertook the preparation of an adequate number of copies to facilitate the assessment of the completeness and correctness of the document by the panel of experts who have taken part in reviewing previous drafts of FFCD. As it stands now, the document, together with Annexes on procurement and equipment status, has been expanded to some 1400 pages and its evaluation will require several months to complete.

B. ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

7. In the period under review (1 April 1996 - 1 October 1996), the Baghdad-based IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group has conducted 171 monitoring inspections, twenty of which were carried out at sites which had not been previously inspected. This brings the total number of OMV inspections since the start of OMV implementation in August 1994 to over 600. The majority of these inspections were carried out with no prior announcement and a number of them were conducted in co-operation with other monitoring groups of the Special Commission. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials, or activities was detected.

8. Since July 1995, and within the frame of their OMV activities, the IAEA and the Special Commission have started to implement a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites that in the judgement of IAEA/UNSCOM are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, despite the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of joint IAEA-UNSCOM multi-disciplinary inspections at "capable" sites on a regular basis will contribute to the

effectiveness of the OMV Plans to detect any attempt by Iraq to conduct activities proscribed by Security Council resolutions. To date, eight such inspections at "capable" sites - co-ordinated by the IAEA - have been conducted by joint IAEA-UNSCOM teams. On 7 July 1996, the fifth such multi-disciplinary inspection of a "capable" site met with some difficulties in gaining immediate access to the site. The facility to be inspected was a factory building located inside an army camp. On arrival at the entrance gate, the joint IAEA/UNSCOM team was advised that the facility was an installation of the Special Guards and as such was considered to be a sensitive site. Hence, the UNSCOM "modalities for inspection of sensitive sites" were to be applied. The team was kept at the gate for approximately two hours waiting for the arrival from Baghdad of a high-ranking Iraqi officer, before being granted access and allowed to proceed with the inspection. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials, or activities was detected.

9. The Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) has continued its ongoing programme of interviews of key personnel in the former Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Programme (NWP). These interviews permit the IAEA to clarify points regarding the former NWP and to verify the current assignment of key personnel.

10. The seventh periodic radiometric survey of Iraq's main water bodies was conducted from 20 to 27 April 1996. Samples of water, sediments, and biota were collected at 15 sites selected at random from the more than 50 locations for which baseline data had been established in the original survey completed in November 1992.

C. PROCUREMENT MATTERS

11. The finding in Amman, Jordan of a CNC filament-winding machine the procurement of which was initiated by Iraq in mid-1990 for the production of carbon-fibre cylinders for uranium enrichment gas centrifuges, was described in the previous report (document S/1996/261).

12. With the assistance of the government of Jordan, further progress was made in clarifying the type and quantities of materials and equipment procured in Western countries on behalf of the Iraqi uranium centrifuge

enrichment project. A Singapore based private company then re-routed each consignment to another private company in Amman, Jordan, from where the final shipment to Iraq had been planned.

13. This transshipment scheme through Singapore and Jordan was apparently set in place in the period immediately following the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq by Security Council resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. The Iraqi counterpart has provided details on this operation to the IAEA and has specified that they received through these arrangements only two consignments (vibration measuring and monitoring equipment) prior to March 1991. The Iraqi authorities indicated that shipments from Singapore to Amman continued during 1991 and one of them concerned the above mentioned filament-winding machine. They also stated that they instructed the Jordanian company to store these consignments in Amman. The information provided by Iraq to the IAEA included the number of consignments, indication of content, and details on the costs of the transactions. They further stated that to the best of their knowledge the consignments in question were still in Amman in late 1994 and beginning of 1995. Around that time, they instructed the Jordanian company to dispose of the material and equipment by selling or scrapping.

14. The information provided by Iraq was shared with the Jordanian authorities and lead to the impounding on 1 September 1996 of a large variety of equipment and materials, stored in their original shipping crates in a warehouse in Amman, related to gas-centrifuge manufacturing and centrifuge cascade technology. Shipment lists and procurement correspondence was also found which confirmed the origin of the goods and the transshipment arrangements through Singapore and Jordan.

15. A team of IAEA experts went to Jordan in early September and prepared a detailed inventory of all materials and equipment seized by the Jordanian authorities. Follow-up actions are being undertaken with the assistance of concerned governments to verify the completeness of the findings.

D. EXPLOITATION OF THE DOCUMENTATION CACHE

16. In the period under review, progress has been made in the analysis of documents handed over by the Iraqi counterpart after the departure to

Jordan of the late Lt. General Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majid. These documents included some fifty thousand 35 mm microfilm aperture cards and approximately 9 km of microfilm rolls (35 mm and 16 mm) containing an estimated 600,000 frames.

17. With the assistance of experts in various disciplines provided by Member States, a review of the 30,000 aperture cards was completed in August 1996. An earlier review by the IAEA's Action Team had revealed that the content of the aperture cards consisted of technical charts, drawings, graphs and tables with no text except in the card legend. The analysis of this material lead to the following conclusions:

- The content of the aperture card file appears to add little to the knowledge so far developed of the past Iraqi covert programme.
- The large number and professional quality of the drawings found in the aperture card file are inconsistent with the Iraqi statements that the programme had produced neither a full set of drawings of all weapon components nor drawings integrating the assembled weapon and its missile delivery system.
- A small number of drawings related to weapon components was found, but none of these drawings concerned the weapon assembly, the nuclear charge (pit), or the implosion package components.

18. In parallel to the aperture card review, a set of 49 rolls of microfilm containing approximatel, 75,000 frames was screened by the IAEA's Action Team. Most of these rolls (in either 16 mm or 35 mm format) were handed over to the NMG in February and July 1996. The number of frames reviewed represents about 10% of the estimated amount of documents in microfilm in possession of the Action Team.

19. While the review of this documentation adds little to the current Action Team understanding of the past Iraqi covert nuclear programme, some elements of interest emerged which can be summarised as follows:

- The English documents contained in the microfilm deal with routine business transactions for ordinary construction engineering projects. The same holds true for most of the Arabic documents reviewed;

- The procurement related documents may be useful to complete the list of pre-Gulf war Iraqi suppliers, although the majority of them relate to non-sensitive areas;

- These microfilms were characterised by intermixed English and Arabic documents in no apparent order, 35 mm reels with no frame numbers (making location of specific documents very difficult), documents and drawings relating to a specific project separated by documents and drawings from totally unrelated projects, and documents and drawings filmed out of sequence. The state of these microfilms is not inconsistent with Iraqi statements regarding the disorganized and haphazard wartime microfilming effort at the Al Hayrat building (one of the Baghdad offices of PC-3).

- Most of the microfilms had to be rewound in order to review them, indicating the microfilms had been reviewed at least once before being delivered to the IAEA.

E. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

20. The Action Team's computerized information systems have been upgraded to increase the Team's analytical capabilities and to facilitate monitoring and verification activities in the field. This upgrading includes:

- An improved user interface;

- Facilities which allow the retrieval of computerized images of site plans, buildings, and equipment;

- Search and retrieval systems for newly provided Iraqi documents;

- A system for tracking the inspection teams' actual movements within Iraq; and

- A planning and follow-up information module.

21. The information data bases have been expanded to cover all of Iraq's declarations and information regarding relevant sites, activities, materials, and equipment. The total data stored is equivalent to approximately eighty thousand pages of text. All this information is easily accessible by computerized search and retrieval.

F. PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY IRAQ UNDER THE OMV PLAN

22. Under the provision of paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the IAEA's OMV Plan Iraq is providing twice a year - in January and July - declarations on the current use of facilities, installations, and sites formerly involved in their covert nuclear programme and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and the location of materials, equipment, and radioisotopes identified in the Annex 3 and 4 of the Plan.

23. In June 1996, the NMG agreed with the Iraqi Nuclear Monitoring Directorate (NMD) on a number of improvements and amendments needed to complete prior OMV-related declarations, to account for the new information received on the past Iraqi nuclear programme, following the departure to Jordan of the late Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel in August 1995.

24. The review by the Action Team of the July 1996 declaration has shown that many of the agreed improvements and amendments have been added, but that further efforts by NMD are required to achieve the correctness, completeness of information, and a satisfactory reporting standard. Detailed discussions were therefore undertaken in September 1996 with the NMD to explain what was still missing. Assurance was given that remaining shortcomings will be dealt with in time for the January 1997 reports.

G. RELEASE, RELOCATION AND CHANGE OF THE USE OF EQUIPMENT MATERIAL AND FACILITIES

25. In the period under review, the NMD has submitted 17 requests to the IAEA concerning the release/relocation of equipment and materials or change of use of monitored buildings. All requests were processed in consultation with the Special Commission and eleven were approved. The remaining six are still pending. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

III. HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS

26. On 7 June 1996, General Amer Rashid Al Ubaydi met the Director General at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to discuss current issues which were of concern to the Iraqi government. He referred in particular to the time consuming process undertaken by the IAEA to verify the correctness and

completeness of the FFCD which involved analyses of "less significant details". Gen. Amer touched on the monitoring of the present assignments of former key staff involved in the nuclear covert programme. He also added that the IAEA's opinion that Iraq still retained a complete record of the nuclear programme was "totally wrong". In addressing those comments, the Director General noted that the IAEA Secretariat was well focussed on matters of significance, and was using its best efforts to reach a conclusion as soon as feasible. It should be understood, however, that the events of August 1995 and the revelation of the "crash programme" had prompted further inquiries. Technical expertise still existed in Iraq even if the facilities and equipment had been neutralised and this made ongoing monitoring inevitable. As part of the monitoring process, the Director General stated that it was important to the IAEA to verify current activities of people previously involved in the nuclear programme.

27. From 24 to 29 June 1996, the leader of the IAEA Action Team was in Baghdad and had separate meetings with the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Gen. Amer Rashid Al Ubaydi and Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, the minister formerly responsible for PC-3. Progress made since the last round of high-level technical talks (August 1995) was reviewed. Problems linked to the verification of the correctness and completeness of the FFCD and to the monitoring of personnel current assignments were discussed and assurance was given of the Iraqi Government's intention to facilitate the task of the Action Team in every possible way.

IV. SUMMARY

28. The IAEA continues with the rigorous implementation of its plan for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions through the resident inspectors of the Nuclear Monitoring Group with the assistance of, and in full co-ordination with, the Special Commission. As underlined in previous reports to the Council, the implementation of the OMV Plan does not foreclose the exercise by the IAEA of its right to investigate further any aspects of the Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme, in particular as regards any further information that Iraq may still be withholding from the IAEA. The Iraqi counterpart has continued to co-operate with the IAEA in a productive way. During the period under review the Nuclear Monitoring Group conducted 171 inspections

at some 73 facilities, 20 of which were not previously inspected. In the period since the last report to the Council, the IAEA has not seen instances of activities, or the presence, in Iraq, of equipment or materials proscribed by those resolutions.

29. All quantities of special nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) found in Iraq have been removed, and the industrial infrastructure which Iraq had set up to produce and weaponize special nuclear material has been destroyed. The IAEA is conscious, however, that the know-how and expertise acquired by Iraqi scientists and engineers could provide an adequate base for re-constituting a nuclear weapons oriented programme. A continuing high level of vigilance is therefore necessary.

30. On 7 September 1996, Iraq submitted what it declared was the final version of the "Full, Final, and Complete Declaration" called for in Security Council resolution 707 (1991). The IAEA is undertaking an in-depth appraisal of this document aiming at assessing its correctness and completeness and focussing, in particular, on those areas where, in the opinion of IAEA, Iraq's achievements may have been understated. It can be expected that the assessment of the FFCD will require several months to complete.

31. The original Iraqi documentation concerning the past nuclear programme continues to be examined and further additions have been made in the period under review as the counterpart has realised that the correctness and completeness of their statements must rest on original project documents.

32. In discharging the tasks assigned to it, the IAEA continues to benefit from the strong support of the Council and from the assistance of Member States through the secondment of cost-free experts, the access to advanced technologies, and the provision of information and technical advice.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/834
8 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It has come to our attention that a presidential statement is being considered by the Security Council regarding the report on human rights abuses in Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most. The murders, acts of ethnic cleansing and other abuses committed deserve the Council's attention. We support the efforts of those who seek to have the Council address the matter. It is our own opinion, nonetheless, that the most appropriate and serious measures that the Council can undertake is to ensure that those responsible for these crimes are arrested and brought to justice, and that those that shield the internationally indicted are, in turn, sanctioned by the international community. There has not been an appropriate response to the Security Council's demands contained in its presidential statement of 8 August 1996 (S/PRST/1996/34). The Council is obliged now to adopt the measures that justice and a durable peace demand and short-sighted political expediency avoids.

We also ask the Security Council to take into consideration the report dated 16 August 1996 to the Security Council and General Assembly entitled "Third annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991" (A/51/292-S/1996/665).

Paragraph 167 of the report states:

> "The degree of cooperation encountered has varied remarkably among these States and Entities. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been by far the most cooperative party: 'it has replied to nearly every warrant addressed to it, explaining its inability to execute arrest warrants in Bosnian territories outside its control, and is one of the two parties to date which has executed arrest warrants addressed to it, namely the warrants against Delić and Landžo. These arrests were important events in the history of State cooperation with the Tribunal. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also allowed an office to be established in Sarajevo and has provided Tribunal investigators with access to sites and persons."

Paragraph 168 of the report states: "On the other end of the spectrum, Republika Srpska has failed to execute any of the scores of arrest warrants which have been addressed to it, or to explain its inability or failure to do so ..."

Paragraph 169 of the report states:

> "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has an almost equally dismal record of cooperation with the Tribunal. It is to be noted that under the Dayton Accord, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is responsible for Republika Srpska's cooperation and compliance as well as its own ... It has, however, failed to arrest any indictees in its territory and has further allowed prominent indictees ... to appear publicly in Belgrade with impunity" ...

Paragraph 203 of the report concludes:

> "The Tribunal, however, still depends heavily on State cooperation to discharge its mandate, and without the cooperation of some of the States or Entities of the former Yugoslavia (notably the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which is only cooperating to a limited extent and not in the crucial areas, and Republika Srpska, which is failing to cooperate even minimally), the arrest and transfer of major indictees, notably Karadžić, Mladić and Kordić, are a forlorn hope. Croatia, while it is cooperating in part, must nevertheless exercise its acknowledged authority and influence over Bosnian Croats to effect the arrest of indictees such as Kordić and Rajić."

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative
Special Envoy

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/835
8 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Allow me, first, to congratulate you on assuming the functions of President of the Security Council for this month. I am convinced that your skilful guidance of its deliberations will ensure the productive and successful work of this important body of the family of nations.

I would also like to once again repeat myself and extend my Government's sincere gratitude to the United Nations, its Security Council and particularly to the group of countries known as the Friends of Georgia, for their continued dedication to the cause of restoring lasting peace in my country.

The systematic and persistent efforts of the international community aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, still runs up against the intransigence of the Abkhaz leadership, which fails to consider compromise a moral category.

In all its previous resolutions, and particularly in its resolution 1065 (1996) of 12 July 1996, the Security Council has demanded "that the Abkhaz side accelerate significantly the process of voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons without delay or preconditions". It has also affirmed "the unacceptability of the demographic changes resulting from the conflict".

In response to this call of the world community, the separatist leadership not only showed utter disregard for the decisions of the Security Council, but exacerbated the situation even more so by scheduling the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in Abkhazia, Georgia, by November 1996.

We strongly believe that under present circumstances, when Abkhazia is left uninhibited by Georgians, when more than 300,000 refugees and displaced persons remain homeless, disenfranchised and humiliated, and in the face of the present demographic conditions, this decision is not only unlawful but also immoral, capable of damaging the peace process beyond repair.

We also have serious grounds to predict consequences far worse than just a stall in the peace process. The scheduled elections may irrevocably shatter the hope for the negotiated settlement of the dispute and spur the population on to uncontrollable actions. The resumption of hostilities will certainly set in motion a fateful process not only in Abkhazia, Georgia, but in the entire region of the Caucasus.

We believe that at a time of the Secretary-General's pending interim report on Georgia, the international community should unequivocally denounce this adventurist step of the Abkhaz authorities and take serious measures to prevent another conflagration in Georgia.

The Security Council has always been committed to Georgia's territorial integrity and has more than once affirmed this commitment by word and deed. We are confident that the world Organization will adequately react to the provocative actions of the separatists and will reflect its resolve in relevant documents of the United Nations.

I would be most grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Peter Chkheidze
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/51/468
S/1996/83
8 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 11

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Identical letters dated 7 October 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letters from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq dated 9 September 1996 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/731) and to the Secretary-General (A/51/343), both of 10 September 1996, concerning the security situation in northern Iraq.

First of all, I should like to underline that, since the end of the Gulf war, Turkey has consistently expressed its commitment to the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and has acted accordingly.

At the same time, it is an incontrovertible fact that a terrorist organization is using northern Iraq to launch terrorist attacks across the border into Turkish territory and is targeting innocent people. Turkey cannot and will not accept the negative reflection on her security of Iraq's inability to exercise control over northern Iraq. Turkey is not responsible for the inability of Iraq to control the area in question.

The singular aim of the temporary danger zone declared along the strip of land parallel to the Turkish-Iraqi border is to bar the infiltration of terrorist elements into Turkey from Iraq. Its objective is to act as a deterrent and to put a stop to the terrorist activities that have intensified in the region adjacent to our border as a result of events of the last few weeks.

The declaration of the temporary danger zone cannot be in any way a violation of the territorial integrity of Iraq, as Turkey has neither any claim of sovereignty over this area, nor is there a question of military occupation.

If it had been possible to prevent terrorist activity directed against Turkey originating from northern Iraq, the need for Turkey to enter into arrangements such as the temporary danger zone would not have arisen. The temporary danger zone is, as the name indicates, entirely a temporary defensive measure expected to remain in force until State authority is established in some manner in the region.

Therefore, the Turkish Government categorically rejects the claim that the legitimate security measures taken by Turkey against terrorist activities originating from northern Iraq, and targeting Turkish territory and population, aim at violating Iraqi sovereignty or constitute military aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 11, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/837
8 October 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of the Republic of Iraq's airspace by United States, British and French aircraft continued over the period from 16 to 30 September 1996 and that those aircraft carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation. The details are as set forth in the annex to this letter.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions which, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause material damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq asserts its right to seek legal compensation for the losses being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Republic of Iraq in consequence of these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

1. In the northern region 104 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Aqrah, Amadiyah, Zakho, Rawandoz, Sinjar and Ayn Zalah.

2. In the southern region 784 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Qurnah, Artawi, Chabaish, Jalibah, Salman, Shatrah, Razzazah, Lasaf, Najaf, Qal'at Salih, Shinafiyah, Nu'maniyah, Ali al-Sharqi, Busayyah, Janub Razzazah, Rumaythah and Amarah.

3. On 15 occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.